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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SCHOOL DESEGREGATION-
THE CONUNDRUM OF DE-FACTO AND DE-JURE
SEGREGATION
The plaintiffs, seven minor children, brought an action by their respective
parents seeking a mandatory injunction requiring the Waukegan City School
District to revise its grade school attendance units to eliminate racial im-
balance, pursuant to the Armstrong Act, an Illinois statute ordering such re-
vision "as soon as practicable". 1 The composition of the grade schools
within the district was as follows: Of the five grade schools therein, four
were composed of at least 98 per cent white students; whereas in the fifth
school, only 15 per cent of its students were white, the remaining 85 per
cent being predominantly Negro. This situation, as stipulated by the plain-
tiffs, was not the result of any affirmative, intentional, or discriminatory
actions of the school board. The trial court held that the statute is constitu-
tional and that it is validly applied to de facto school segregation. A decree
was issued, ordering the defendant board to file a plan of reasonable re-
vision in the attendance units, designed to alleviate the existing imbalance.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, holding that the Armstrong
Act is in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, and of the special legislation prohi-
bition in the Illinois Constitution.2 The rule then advanced by the court was
that programs to create equal educational opportunities must be administered
without regard to race.8 Upon rehearing, the court reversed itself, affirming the
order of the lower court and upholding the constitutionality of the Armstrong
Act. Tometz v. Board of Education, Waukegan City School District No. 61,
-Ill.2d-, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968).
The Tometz decision joins a modem trend of cases, wherein a state's
method of alleviating de facto school segregation is constitutionally eval-
uated. 4 The case is especially important because it is one of two decisions by
1111. Rev. Stat., ch. 122 § 10-21.3 (1967) provides that among the duties of school
boards is the following: "To establish one or more attendance units within the district.
As soon as practicable, and from time to time thereafter, the board shall change or
revise existing units or create new units in a manner which will take into consideration
the prevention of segregation and the elimination of separation of children in public
schools because of color, race, or nationality. All records pertaining to the creation,
alteration or revision of attendance units shall be open to the public." There is also
similar language in ]ll. Rev. Stat., ch. 122 § 34-18 (7) (Powers of the Board of Educa-
tion), § 34-22 (School buildings) (1967).
2111. Const. art. IV, § 22.
8 Tometz v. Board of Educ., Waukegan City School Dist. No. 61, No. 40292 (Supreme
Court of Illinois, March, 1967).
4 School Comm'n of Boston v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967),
appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968); Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist., 209
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a court of last resort5 in which a state has attempted to eliminate such
segregation by direct, mandatory legislation, rather than by declaration of
administrative policy or encouragement of voluntary local action. Although
the Brown6 decisions sounded the death knell for segregation of the races
in public schools by direct state action, the constitutionality of de facto
segregated schools 7 remains in doubt.8 With the growing public realization
that such segregation is widespread, and that its potential effects on the
segregated minority are grave, the task of eliminating racial imbalance has
been undertaken by several states,9 notwithstanding the absence of a declared
constitutional mandate to that effect. Also, local school boards have em-
ployed various means to achieve racial balance among their schools.10
Pa. Super. 37, 224 A.2d 811, modified 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967); Mason v.
Board of Educ., 6 Mich. Ct. App. 364, 149 N.W.2d 239 (1967); Elliot v. Board of
Educ., 94 N.J. Super. 400, 228 A.2d 696 (1967) ; Borko v. Giordano, 29 App. Div. 2d 546,
285 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1967); Offermann v. Nitkowski, 248 F.Supp. 129 (W.D. N.Y. 1965),
aff'd 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Guida v. Board of Educ., 26 Conn. Supp. 121, 213
A.2d 843 (1965); Vetere v. Allen, 41 Misc. 2d 200, 245 N.Y.S.2d 682, modified sub. nom.
Vetere v. Mitchell, 21 App. Div. 2d 561, 251 N.Y.S.2d 480, aff'd 15 N.Y.2d 259, 258
N.Y.S.2d 77, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965); Addabbo v. Donovan, 22 App. Div. 2d
383, 256 N.Y.S.2d 178, aff1'd 16 N.Y.2d 619, 261 N.Y.S.2d 68, cert denied, 382 U.S.
905 (1965) ; Booker v. Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1, 11 A.L.R.3d 754 (1965) ;
Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 200 A. 2d 97 (1964) ; Schults v. Board of Educ.,
86 N.J. Super. 29, 205 A. 2d 762 (1964); Balaban v. Rubin, 20 App. Div. 2d 438, 248
N.Y.S.2d 574, aff'd 14 N.Y.2d 193, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964);
Strippoli v. Bickal, 21 App. Div. 2d 365, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969, motion denied, 15 N.Y.2d 1036,
260 N.Y.S.2d 185, aff'd 16 N.Y.2d 652, 261 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1964); Di Sano v. Storandt,
22 App. Div. 2d 6, 253 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1964); Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. N.J.
1964), vacated and remanded, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965).
5 The other decision is School Committee of Boston v. Board of Educ., supra note 4.
6 Brown v. Board of Educ. (hereinafter Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v.
Board of Educ. (hereinafter Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
7 The terms, "de facto segregation" and "racial imbalance" are used synonymously in
this note, both denoting the existence of racial separation in schools, absent deliberate
state action.
8 1 U.S. Co2mne'N ON CrviL RIGHTS, RACIAL IsOLATION N THE Puauc SCHOOLS 185
(1967).
9See generally id. at 229. Specific efforts of four states, California, Massachussetts,
New York, and Pennsylvania are discussed in the text, infra.
10 Redistricting and reassignment of grade levels at each school: Offermann v. Nit-
kowski, supra note 4; Borko v. Giordano, supra note 4; Schults v. Board of Educ.,
supra note 4; Balaban v. Rubin, supra note 4; Mason v. Board of Educ., supra note 4;
Elliott v. Board of Educ., supra note 4; Fuller v. Volk, supra note 4. Relocation of pupils
from disestablished schools by choice and lottery: Morean v. Board of Educ., supra
note 4. Voluntary or compulsory transfer plans, providing transportation, viz. bussing:
Di Sano v. Storandt, supra note 4; Strippoli v. Bickal, supra note 4; Guida v. Board
of Educ., supra note 4. Voluntary transfer plan, no transportation provided: Booker v.
Board of Educ., supra note 4.
Tometz, therefore, has a necessary impact on these various methods. It is
the purpose of this note both to examine the effect of Tometz on programs to
eliminate racial imbalance in general, and to specifically analyze the problems
inherent in effectuating racial balance by direct legislation.
THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court in Brown left no doubt as to the un-
constitutionality of de jure segregated schools: segregation of school children
on the basis of race was held to deprive the minority group of equal educa-
tional opportunity, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, notwithstanding the equality of other tangible and
physical factors.1 However, subsequent federal interpretations of the four-
teenth amendment have been restrictive. Courts of appeals in five federal
circuits, deciding cases which dealt with the problem of racially imbalanced
schools, have held that the fourteenth amendment as interpreted by Brown
imposes no duty to eliminate such imbalance. 12 Moreover, federal district
courts in Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, New York, and Texas have con-
curred in similar cases.15 The refusal of the courts to apply the equal pro-
tection clause to situations of racial imbalance has been carried to the ex-
treme on at least one occasion. In Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana,14
plaintiffs were denied relief from attending de facto segregated schools, pred-
icated on the fact that the schools involved had been honestly and conscien-
tiously administered, pursuant to a neighborhood school policy. 15 Moreover,
it was held that so long as the schools are so administered, the system need
not be destroyed or abandoned. 16 The import of this holding is that
honestly and conscientiously administered school systems would not be
11 Brown I, supra note 6, at 493. Such segregation was also held to violate fifth amend-
ment due process, Bolling v. Sharpe, supra note 6, at 500.
12 Offermann v. Nitkowski, supra note 4; Deal v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 55
(6th Cir. 1965); Gilliam v. School Board, 345 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965); Downs v.
Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1964) ; Bell v. School
City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
924 (1963). See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R. 3d 780 (1967).
13 Olson v. Board of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 367
F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966); Broussard v. Independent School Dist., 262 F. Supp. 266
(S.D. Tex. 1966); Lynch v. Board of Educ., 229 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1964);
Webb v. Board of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. I. 1963); Henry v. Godsell, 165 F.
Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
14 Supra note 12.
15 Bell v. School City, supra note 12, at 829.
16 Bell v. School City, supra note 12. Accord, Gilliam v. School Board, supra note 12,
at 328; Downs v. Board of Educ., supra note 12, at 998; Deal v. Board of Educ., supra
note 12, at 59-60.
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violative of the fourteenth amendment, even though such schools were found
to deprive the segregated minority of its equal opportunity to education in
fact. The objectivity of the method of administration could therefore consti-
tutionally justify the most extreme case of racial imbalance in public
schools. State action sufficient for a practice to fall within the purview of the
fourteenth amendment would, by this holding, have to be affirmative and
intentional.17 This rationale reflects the distinction perceived by the courts
between de facto and de jure segregation. While the latter is recognized as in-
herently unconstitutional, the former has on occasion been deemed inherently
constitutional, as in Bell. Only recently have federal district courts in New
York and Massachusetts recognized via specific holdings the possibility of
a de facto segregated school system becoming unconstitutional in fact.' 8
Thus, the court in Blocker v. Board of Education of Manhasset, New York 9
ordered the dissolution of conditions of racial imbalance, but cautioned:
This court does not hold that the neighborhood school policy per se is unconsti-
tutional; it does hold that this policy is not immutable. It does not hold that ra-
cial imbalance, not tantamount to segregation is violative of the Constitution. It
does hold that . . . the defendant Board has transgressed the prohibitions of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
20
This realization, that state-tolerated de facto segregation could deprive the
minority of equal educational opportunity and thereby violate the fourteenth
amendment, might have been the initial step in court involvement with the
disestablishment of such segregation. But federal courts have not followed
suit. Either for the reasons advanced in Bell,2 1 or for want of sufficient state
17 This limitation on what constitutes state action is not consistent with some past
Supreme Court interpretations. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), wherein
enforcement of a restrictive covenant by a state court was held to be sufficient state
action to invoke the fourteenth amendment. Might this also apply to court enforce-
ment of de facto segregation by denying remedial relief? Would a decision such as
Bell, supra note 12, constitute such state action that might convert de facto to de
jure segregation in theory? Other instances of liberal interpretations of state action in-
clude: Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963), held that public statements by
city officials opposing restaurant desegregation are tantamount to city ordinances and
therefore constitute sufficient state action; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961), held that where a state leases property to a private business
which discriminates among its patrons by race, this constitutes sufficient state action;
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See generally Peters, Civil Rights and State
Non-Action, 34 NoTrE DAME LAW. 303 (1959).
18 Barksdale v. School Comm'n, 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1963), vacated on other
grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965); Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208
(E.D. N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (ED. N.Y. 1962).
19 Supra note 18.
20 Supra note 18, at 230.
2 1 Supra note 12.
action,22 no federal court has deemed it appropriate to order the dises-
tablishment of de facto school segregation since the 1965 Barksdale decision.23
Therefore, the problem of determining the effects of racial school imbalance
and its remedies has been left to the legislativ-. and executive branches of
the state governments, and to Congress.
Only four states in addition to Illinois have responded through affirmative
direct action: California has incorporated into its statutes a declaration of
policy to the effect that those charged with the establishment of school dis-
tricts shall consider the ethnic composition of the areas involved, with
the purpose of avoiding practices which maintain segregation "in practical
effect." 24 This statement of policy was recognized and approved in dicta by
the California Supreme Court in Jackson v. Pa.adena City School District.25
Pennsylvania entered the field by virtue of an investigation by a legislative
commission, culminating in a state supreme court decision, Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission v. Chester School District,26 wherein the court
upheld the power of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, a
creature of the legislature, 27 to file a complaint against a school board, in
whose district existed racial imbalance, for violation of the state prohibition
of unlawful discriminatory practices. 28 The power vested in the Commission
can assume a mandatory character in that the Commission may initiate
its own investigative action, make its own determinations as to the existence
and effects of racial imbalance in each case, and issue an order enjoining
maintenance of the discriminatory practice and prescribing corrective ac-
tion.29 Massachusetts' attack was more extensive. In 1965, the legislature
passed the Racial Imbalance Act, 0 which instructed the state board of edu-
cation to "provide technical and other assistance in the formulation and
execution of plans to eliminate racial imbalan-e,"' 1 provided for judicial re-
22 The two reasons mentioned are not to be considered mutually exclusive. See, e.g.,
Deal v. Board of Educ., supra note 12, at 63.
28 Supra note 18.
24 CAL. AOm. CODE, §§ 2010-11 (1963).
25 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963). The statute was not
germane to the court's decision because state gerrymandering of school districts had
been discovered.
26Supra note 4.
2 7 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, §§ 956-57 (Supp. 1967).
28 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 955(i) (Supp. 1967).
29 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 959 (Supp. 1967). Such order would be subject to judicial
review under PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 960 (Supp. 1967).
80 MAss. ANNq. LAws, ch.15, §§ 11, 1J, 1K (1966) ; ch. 71, §§ 37 C, 37 D (1966).
81 MAss. ANN. LAws, ch.15, §II (1966).
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view of the actions of the board of education pursuant to the above,3 2 and
established an advisory committee on racial imbalance, to be appointed by
the board of education.33 The legislature also established standards by which
racial imbalance was to be determined3 4 by local school authorities. The
Racial Imbalance Act was court-tested and upheld in School Committee of
Boston v. Board of Education.3 5 To date the Act represents the most exten-
sive legislative directive concerning the elimination of de facto school segrega-
tion.36 In New York, quasi-legislative action against racial imbalance has
been taken through the office of the Commissioner of Education, 7 based
upon the issuance of an order to local school officials, requiring: reports of
local racial distribution in each district; a statement of policy from each
local board with respect to achieving racial balance; and a plan for action
to eliminate racial imbalance, if needed.3 8 New York courts have generally
approved local plans pursuant to this orderA9 Except for these five, no
state has significantly responded to the potential stigma of de facto segre-
gated schools. 40
Congress has not legislated directly with respect to racial imbalance.
4 1
The public education provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains
specific disclaimers of the intent to include de facto segregation within the
purview of the Act, both in defining "desegregation" in general 4 2 and in
82MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch.15, §1J (1966).
83 MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch.15, § 1K (1966).
34 MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch.71, § 37C (Supp. 1967) provides: "The term 'racial imbalance'
refers to a ratio between non-white and other students in public schools which is
sharply out of balance with the racial composition of the society in which non-white
children study, serve, and work. For the purpose of this section, racial imbalance shall
be deemed to exist when the per cent of non-white students in any public school is in
excess of fifty per cent of the total number of students in such school." See Mass.
Gen. Laws, ch.71, § 37B (1966).
85 Supra note 4. The appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for
want of a federal question.
36 Supra note 8, at 186.
37 Memo from the State Commissioner of Education to all Chief Local School Ad-
ministrators and Presidents of Boards of Education, 8 RACE REL. REP. 838 (1963).
88 Id.
39 See, e.g., Borko v. Giordano, supra note 4; Vetere v. Allen, supra note 4; Addabbo
v. Donovan, supra note 4; Di Sano v. Storandt, supra note 4; Strippoli v. Bickal, supra
note 4.
40 Supra note 8, at 187.
41Supra note 8, at 237-238. Note that Congress has, however, financially assisted
school systems which have taken corrective measures with respect to racial imbalance,
through institutes and grants for consultation and training, programs on intercultural
understanding, and remedial instruction.
4242 U.S.C.A. § 2000c(b)(1964).
authorizing suits by the Attorney General against school boards under cer-
tain circumstances.4 3 Although the extent of these disclaimers is arguable,"
federal courts have not applied the requirements of the 1964 Act to racially
imbalanced schools.4 5
HISTORY
The progress of the alleviation of racial isolation in public schools, absent
deliberate state action, has been minimal. Without a history of a state-im-
posed dual school system, racially separated school systems may exist for
the most part undisturbed, and generally they do so exist. For example, al-
though Illinois has outlawed de jure segregation since 1874,46 integration
has not yet been accomplished. Of the approximately 206,000 Negro children
in Chicago elementary schools in 1965-66, 89 per cent attended schools
whose population consisted of at least 90 per cent Negroes; of approximately
15,000 Negro students in East St. Louis during the same period, 80 per cent
attended schools whose population was at least 90 per cent Negro; in Peoria,
87 per cent of the approximately 17,000 Negroes in elementary schools
during 1965-66 attended schools wherein Negro students were in the majority
(greater than 50 per cent) . 7 There is further evidence indicating the exis-
tence of racial imbalance in states which had not imposed racial separation
upon their school children:
The high degree of racial separation in the schools . . . is found in the North as
well as the Southern and border States. In Buffalo, N.Y., for example, 77 percent
of the Negro elementary schoolchildren attend schools that are more than 90 per-
cent Negro, while 81 percent of the whites are in nearly all-white schools ....
In Gary, Ind., the figures are 90 percent and 76 percent, respectively. ... In Flint,
Mich., 86 percent of the Negro elementary schoolchildren are in majority-Negro
schools; in Milwaukee, 87 percent .... 48
Nor has racial balance been achieved in those school systems which bear a
43 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c-6(a) (2) (1964).
44 See, e.g., Dissenting opinion of Gewin, J., in United States v. Jefferson County
Board of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 397 (5th Cir. 1967). See generally, supra note 8, at 236-38.
45 See, e.g., Moses v. Parish School Board 276 F. Supp. 834, 856 (E.D. La. 1967);
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educ., supra note 44, at 390; Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 494 (D.D.C. 1967).
46 Chase v. Stephenson, 71 Il. 383 (1874) ; Hurd Rev. Stat., ch. 122, § 100 (1874) [now
Il. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, § 10-22.5 (Supp. 1967)].
47 2 U.S. Coma'N oN Crni RI O s, RAIAL ISOLATzON n T= PuBLIc Scuoots S
(1967).
4 8 Supra note 8, at 5.
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history of de jure segregation, and hence would fall within the purview of
Brown, as indicated in the following table: 49
Per-cent of Total Negro Schoolchildren Attending Nearly All-Negro Schools
(at least 90%)
Before Brown (1950-51) After Brown (1965-66)
Miami, Fla. 100.0% 91.4%
Charlotte, N.C. 100.0 95.7
Okla. City, Okla. 100.0 90.5
Dallas, Tex. 100.0 82.6
Washington, D.C. 100.0 90.4
Kansas City, Mo. 100.0 69.1
Wilmington, Del. 100.0 49.7
Although these figures reflect a slight decrease in the per cent of Negroes
in predominantly Negro schools, the number of Negroes in almost all-Negro
schools has risen. Thus it is, that "[t]he rising Negro enrollment, combined
with only slight desegregation, has produced a substantial increase in the
number of Negroes attending all-Negro or nearly all-Negro schools in
Southern and border state cities." 50 The reason for the failure of state and
local school authorities to effectively apply the mandate of Brown is not
easily analyzed: Local discretionary power, residential segregation, student
and teacher assignment methods, and poor administration have all had signifi-
cant effect on racial imbalance.5 ' Certainly the recent United States Supreme
Court "freedom of choice" cases, 52 holding that elimination of legally com-
pelled racial segregation is not sufficient for the satisfactory disestablishment
of de jure segregation, 53 reflects a cognizance of the actual factors perpetua-
ing isolation, irrespective of the nominal policies adopted by school boards.
5 4
49 Statistics were selected from a more extensive table in 2 U.S. Comm'N oN Cvrv.
RIGHTs, RAcA ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SC31OOS 12-19, Table A.3 (1967).
50 Supra note 8, at 10.
51 Supra note 8, at 59.
52 Green v. County School Board, 88 S. Ct. 1689 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ.,
88 S. Ct. 1697 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 88 S. Ct. 1700 (1968).
58 Green v. County School Board, supra note 52 at 1694, invalidating a freedom-
of-choice plan as only a means to an end; Raney v. Board of Educ., supra note 52, at
1700, wherein it was held that court jurisdiction in desegregation cases should be re-
tained until it is clear that diestablishment has been achieved; Monroe v. Board of
Comm'rs, supra note 52, at 1704, invalidating a free-transfer plan similar to that of
Green.
54 This intent is indicated by Brennan, J., referring in Green, supra note 52, at 1694,
to the slow pace of desegregation in the instant case: "[IUt is relevant that this first step
(the freedom-of-choice plan) did not come until some 11 years after Brown I was de-
cided and 10 years after Brown I1 directed the making of a 'prompt and reasonable
start'. . . .Such delays are no longer tolerable . . . ." Why has Justice Brennan used
the words, "no longer"? Were such delays anticipated, and have they been tolerated?
[Vol. XVIII
Also, the recent institution of school desegregation suits in the northern
states55 indicates a recognition by the courts of the existence of a more subtle
form of state-imposed racial separation.56 But the immediate impact of deci-
sions such as these is conjectural and perhaps dubious in view of the lack
of substantial progress made since Brown.
Racially imbalanced school systems are widespread, both in areas with
and without a history of de jure segregation, due to the lack of any court-
proclaimed mandate to undo the effects of de facto segregation, coupled
with the ineffectiveness of the attempts to implement Brown. Local and state
action appears to have a more immediate effect than that which has been
exerted by federal authority. Acts such as the Armstrong Act and the Racial
Imbalance Act, as well as the quasi-legislative action of the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission and the New York Commissioner of Educa-
tion may hold a greater promise of alleviating racial imbalance than do land-
mark Supreme Court decisions. But such action frequently faces the threat
of running aground due to strict interpretation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The question involved is not whether the fourteenth amendment pre-
scribes the elimination of racial imbalance, but rather, what means of al-
leviating such imbalance are permissible? 57
THE BENIGN RACIAL CLASSIFICATION
The primary legal barrier to the implementation of programs to disestab-
lish de facto segregation is the dilemma presented by the benign racial classi-
fication: Does the fourteenth amendment prevent a governing body from
taking cognizance of race, even for a purpose now deemed socially desirable?
In its original holding in the Tometz case, the Illinois Supreme Court assailed
the Armstrong Act as unfounded and unconstitutional, predicated solely
upon the state-prescribed racial classifications inherent in the Act.58 Absent
5 See, e.g., United States v. School Dist. No. 151 of Cook County, Ill., No. 68C755
(NJ). Ill. July 8, 1968).
56 d. This recognition is reflected in the conclusions of law. The court, per Hoff-
man, J., cited the following as elements of de jure segregation: recruitment and assign-
ment of school teachers on a racial basis; policy decisions by the defendant board,
made with respect to attendance zones, site selections, pupil transportation; purposeful
tailoring of the components of a neighborhood school policy so as to conform to
racial compositions of the neighborhoods in the district; building upon private residen-
tial discrimination. Identification of the latter two factors as elements of de jure
segregation expands the scope of the term, as court-applied.
57 The Illinois Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Tometz v. Board of Educ.,
237 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ill. 1968).
58 "Our holding is that programs to create equal educational opportunities must
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment . . . be administered
without regard to race. This is the neutral application of the statement in Brown-
'the fundamental principle [is] that racial discrimination in public education is un-
constitutional.' Just as the neutral principle of free speech protects speech which may
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a legislative finding that racial intermingling would promote equal educa-
tional opportunity, 59 the court perceived no constitutional need sufficient to
sustain the heavy burden of justification imposed by a racial classification.
In its subsequent opinion upholding the racial classification of the Armstrong
Act, however, the court exercised a greater degree of judicial restraint in de-
termining legislative purpose, and construed more liberally the requirements
necessary to justify prescription of racial classification. The ratio decidendi
of this judicial change of position, more than any other one point, is a re-
evaluation of the court's perception of de facto segregation. Noting that the
test of any legislative classification is one of reasonableness-whether the
classification is reasonably calculated to promote a proper legislative pur-
pose,60 the court concludes that the Armstrong Act survives this test. In
view of the growing judicial awareness that "de facto segregation has a
seriously limiting influence on educational opportunity"6 1 and of the Illinois
Constitution's directive that the state legislature provide a thorough and effi-
cient system of free schools,62 the purpose of the legislature is valid. Nor is
an explicit legislative determination of the nexus between racial imbalance
and the denial of equal educational opportunity required:
The legislature is necessarily vested with broad discretionary power to determine
not only what the public interest and welfare require, but what measures are
necessary to secure such interests . . . .The power is elastic and capable of ex-
tension to keep up with human progress. It extends to the great public needs, that
which is sanctioned by usage or held by prevailing morality or strong and pre-
ponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to public welfare .... 63
The different points of view in the two Tometz opinions are representative
of the two sides of the argument: the former, adhering to the maxim that the
Constitution is color-blind; 64 the latter, advancing the theory that the
Constitution may be color-conscious if the end sought is justifiable.6 5
or may not be socially desirable, so also does the principle prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion in public education prevent this type of legislation regardless of the Armstrong
Act's purpose." Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 3.
59 "In those few States where action against racially imbalanced schools has been
sustained, it has been done on the ground that it was for equality of educational op-
portunity. . . "If the purpose of the Armstrong Act is to eliminate racial imbalance, it
would appear to be for integration qua integration. . . ." Id. This argument has been
incorporated into the dissenting opinion to the final Tometz decision, supra note 57, at 507.
60 Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 57, at 502.
61 Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 57, at 503.
62 Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 57, at 503, citing Ill. Const., art. VIII, § 1.
63 Id. at 502-03, quoting from People v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 83, 91, 108 N.E.2d
16, 21 (1952) ; and citing Thillens, Inc. v. Morey, 11 Ill. 2d 579, 583, 144 N.E.2d
735 (1957).
64 See Harlan, J., dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 539 (1896).
65 See generally, Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: the Constitutional
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The latter theory is a derivative of the law which has developed regarding
classifications by a state in general. The test of a legislative classification
advanced in Tometz is generally accepted by the United States Supreme
Court as the criterion used in evaluating a state-imposed classification for
purpose of equal protection.66 The high court would also agree with the
Tometz court that a state legislature is generally allowed a wide range of
discretion in choosing the means to be used in achieving proper goals.67
However, a classification based on race has been deemed an exception to
this practice. Thus, the United States Supreme Court in McLaughlin v.
Florida noted:
... [N]ormally [legislative] judgment is given the benefit of every conceivable
circumstance which might suffice to characterize this classification as reasonable
rather than arbitrary and invidious. . . .But we deal here with a classification
based upon the race of the participants, which must be viewed in light of the
historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate discrimination emanating from official sources in the States. This strong
policy renders racial classifications 'constitutionally suspect' ....68
The constitutional suspicion thus attributed to racial classifications has
resulted in frequent invalidations by the Court.6 9 But those cases were
decided in a context distinctly different from that of Tometz. In those cases,
the purpose of the classification was the separation of the races, resulting
in the denial of a right or access. The racial classification prescribed by the
Armstrong Act has as its apparent purpose the conferral of those rights and
opportunities inherent in equal protection by the amelioration of a racially
separated school system. It is for this purpose, opponents of strict "constitu-
Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REv. 564, 574-83 (1964); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal
World: Equality for the Negro-the Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rv.
363, 398-411 (1966).
66 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ; Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107, 111 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 566-67 (1931); Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 337 (1921).
67 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 66, at 191; McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Morey v. Doud, supra note 66, at 463.
68 Supra note 66, at 191, quoting from Bolling v. Sharpe, supra note 6, at 499.
69See, e.g., cases wherein the Court invalidated racial classifications as applied to:
criminal cohabitation, McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 66; public parks and play-
grounds, Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526(1963); restaurants, Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, supra note 17; railroad riding facilities, Henderson v. United States,
339 U.S. 816 (1950). See Goss v. Board of Education, 378 U.S. 683, 687 (1963), wherein
the Court made the broad statement that: "Classifications based on race for purposes of
transfers between public schools, as here, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." In context, the statement was applied to a school desegregation
plan which allowed white students to escape reassignment. Taken out of context, the
statement might be applied to a benign racial classification.
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tional color-blindness" argue, that the Constitution allows the recognition of
race by the states.70
Federal and state courts have consistently and explicitly recognized this
distinction of purpose, upholding voluntary local actions designed to eliminate
or alleviate racial school imbalance against the charge that it is unconstitu-
tional to take race into consideration.7 1 Hence, there is general accord that
voluntary local action, albeit involving racial classifications, when taken to
further the disestablishment of de facto school segregation, is justifiable, even
in light of the fact that such action is prima facie constitutionally suspect. No
question of the sufficiency of the nexus between the action taken and the
promotion of equal educational opportunity was raised in these cases. Re-
garding evaluation of a state law prescribing that racial classifications be
made, the only case which would serve as precedent to Tometz is School
Committee of Boston v. Board of Education. In that case, the Racial Im-
balance Act survived court scrutiny. The Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachussetts perceived the same distinction regarding racial classifications re-
lated to a proper governmental purpose:
It would be the height of irony if the racial imbalance act, enacted as it was with
the laudable purpose of achieving equal educational opportunities, should, by pre-
scribing pupil allocations based on race, founder on unsuspected shoals in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 72
70 See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876, aff'd en banc 380 F.2d
385 (5th Cir. 1967): "The Constitution is both color-blind and color-conscious. . . . [A]
classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be
based on race. . . .But the Constitution is color-conscious to prevent discrimination
being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination."; Morean v. Board of
Educ., supra note 4, at 243, 200 A.2d at 100: "Constitutional color-blindness may be
wholly apt when the frame of reference is an attack on official efforts toward segregation;
it is not generally apt when the attack is on official efforts toward the avoidance of
segregation."
71 Federal courts: Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Wanner v.
County School Board, 357 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Deal v. Board of Educ., 369
F.2d 55, 59 (6th Cir. 1965) ; Barksdale v. School Comm'n, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (1st Cir.
1965); Fuller v. Volk, 230 F.Supp. 25, 33-34 (S.D. N.J. 1964). State courts: Human
Relations Comm'n v. School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 164, 233 A.2d 290, 294 (1967) ; Mason
v. Board of Educ., 6 Mich. Ct. App. 364, 149 N.W.2d 239, 242 (1967); Borko v.
Giordano, 29 App. Div. 2d 546, 285 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (1967); Guida v. Board of
Educ., 26 Conn. Supp. 121, 123, 213 A.2d 843, 844 (1965); Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d
259, 266-67, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77, 80 (1965) ; Booker v. Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 170-71,
212 A.2d 1, 6 (1965); Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 243, 200 A.2d .97, 100
(1964) ; Schults v. Board of Educ., 86 N.J. Super. 29, 40-41, 205 A.2d 762, 768-69 (1964) ;
Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (1964). Accord, United
States v. Jefferson County Board of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 aff'd en banc 380 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1967); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 509-10 (D.D.C. 1967).
72 School Committee of Boston v. Board of Educ.,, 352 Mass. 693, -, 277 N.E.2d
729, 733. (1967).
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The Massachusetts court coupled the recognition of the possible validity
of a benign racial classification with reliance on a legislative finding that
racial imbalance in public schools is the cause of an emergency within the
state,73 and upon this finding, imposed presumed validity:
All rational presumptions are made in favor of the validity of every legislative
enactment. . . . It is only when a legislative finding cannot be supported upon
any rational basis of fact that reasonably can be conceived to sustain it that a
court is empowered to strike it down. .... 74
Hence, whereas the Massachusetts court connected achievement of racial
balance with equal educational opportunity by depending upon a legislative
finding, then presuming validity; the Illinois court, absent a legislative
finding, established the connection by relying on the legislature's broad dis-
cretionary power. The former approach appears less culpable, especially
since the allowance of broad discretionary power by the Illinois court does
not comport with the United States Supreme Court's view of a racial clas-
sification as constitutionally suspect. A legislative finding by the Illinois
General Assembly somehow indicating the need for achieving racial balance
in schools would have constituted a firmer foundation for the nexus between
the means prescribed by the Armstrong Act and a legitimate government
purpose. This concern with the lack of a reasonable connection was reflected
in the dissenting opinion to Tometz: "If the purpose of the Armstrong Act
is to eliminate racial imbalance, it would appear to be for integration qua in-
tegration without any determination that it would promote equal educa-
tional opportunities. '
75
THE PROBLEM OF PRECISENESS
The Armstrong Act was also considered in the light of a requirement
pertaining specifically to all legislative directives-that of preciseness. Appel-
lants charged that the Armstrong Act is imprecise in that: (1) It fails to
instruct local school boards to consider other factors traditionally relevant
to the drawing of boundary lines; 76 (2) it fails to designate when a school
is racially imbalanced; 77 and (3) it contains no definition of the words
"race" or "color. ' 78 To the first contention, the court, noting that the prior
73 Id.
741d. at 733-34, quoting from Druzik v. Board of Health, 324 Mass. 129, 138-39,
85 N.E.2d 232, 237(1949).
75 Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 57.
76 Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 57, at 504.
77 Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 57, at 504.
78 Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 57, at 504.
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section now superseded by the Armstrong Act contained no such directive,79
answered that the omission of these traditional factors in the Act was not
intended to preclude their consideration; rather, elimination of racial im-
balance was to be included among the factors considered in redistricting
schools.80 The court rejected the second contention, advancing the following
rule:
It is only where the legislative act is so indefinite and uncertain that courts are
unable to determine what the legislature intended, or when the act is so incom-
plete or inconsistent that it cannot be executed, that the law will be invalidated
by reason of indefiniteness or uncertainty. 8 '
The court concluded that the Armstrong Act is capable of being executed,
and that the determination of standards by which racial imbalance shall be
measured may properly be delegated to local authority.8 2 In rejecting the
third contention, the court relied on School Commission of New Bedford v.
Commissioner of Education,8 3 to the effect that the terms "white" and
"non-white" are reasonably susceptible of application by school officials for
the purpose of taking a "racial census."
8 4
It is unlikely that the Illinois legislature's failure to specifically include
consideration of "traditionally relevant" factors within the order of the
Armstrong Act is of any legal consequence, although the Racial Imbalance
Act contains such provisions.8 5 The Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation
79 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 122, § 10-21.3 (1961); "To establish one or more attendance
units within the district."
80 Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 57, at 504.
81 Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 57, at 504, quoting from Drobnick v. City
of Waukegan, 1 Ill. 2d 456, 465 (1953). The Illinois court noted a similar objection
in Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967),
wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the delegatory power of the legislature.
82 Id.
83 Cited by the Tometz court, supra note 57, at 505. In that case, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachussetts upheld the right of the Commissioner of Education
to compel local districts to take a racial census, pursuant to Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 15
§ 11 (1966), 349 Mass. 410, 208 N.E. 2d 814 (1965).
84 School Comm'n of New Bedford v. Commissioner of Education, 349 Mass. 410,
415, 208 N.E.2d 814, 818, (1965):
"[It is contended] that no adequate standards for classifying students as 'white' and
'non-white' are laid down. . . . We recognize the difficulties which may arise in partic-
ular cases .... These terms, however, seem to us reasonably susceptible of application
by school superintendents and teachers for the present general purpose. . . . Even diffi-
cult border-line cases, for practical purposes can probably be solved on the basis of
appearances without making this census inadequate. . . ." But cf. Bittker, The Case of the
Checkerboard Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387, 1421-22
(1965).
85 "Any plan to detail changes . . . with the intention of reducing or eliminating
racial imbalance, must take into consideration on an equal basis with the above-men-
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of the Armstrong Act as prescribing that racial factors be included among
other determinations in drawing boundary lines renders any challenge to the
exclusion of other factors moot. Whether the Act would pass favorably,
insofar as preciseness is concerned, under federal scrutiny will not likely
be decided until the Armstrong Act is implemented on a widespread basis.
Since no local school board would have standing to challenge the statute,86
an individual affected by its implementation would have to bring suit.87
The question of vagueness in such an action would be unique. Generally,
the United States Supreme Court has applied the "vice of vagueness" theory
in appraising state criminal or sedition statutes for violation of fourteenth
amendment due process.8 8 Less frequently, this theory has been held to
apply in civil actions,89 though the standard of certainty required is less
rigorous.90 Nonetheless, "the exaction" of compliance with a statute "must
strip a participant of his rights to come within the principle of these cases." 91
In other words, in order to have standing, an assailant of the Armstrong Act
would have to allege his right to attend a certain school. Federal courts have
generally denied the existence of any such right.92
Although the alleged vagueness of the Armstrong Act is unlikely to pose
an immediate threat to its constitutionality, the Act is in no way self-execut-
ing, and as compared with the Racial Imbalance Act does not lend itself to
tioned intention, the safety of the children involved in travelling from home to school
and school to home." MASS. ANN. LAws, ch. 71 § 37D (1966).
86 "[A] municipal corporation, created by a state . . . , has no privileges or im-
munities under the federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will
of its creator." Williams v. Mayor, City of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40, (1933)
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, (1923).
87 The Massachussetts court recognized this in School Comm'n of Boston v. Board
of Educ., supra note 72, at 699-700, 227 N.E.2d at 734.
88 See, e.g., criminal: Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Raley v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 423 (1959); sedition: Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See
generally Annot., 16 L. Ed. 2d 1231 (1966).
89 Boutilier v. Immigration Service, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
90 See Black, J., dissenting in Barenblatt v. United States, 369 U.S. 109 (1959), re-
hearing denied, 361 U.S. 584 (1960) ; Annot., 16 L. Ed. 2d 1231, 1234 (1966).
91 Boutilier v. Immigration Service, supra note 89, at 123.
92 It has been held that white students may not resist a plan to eliminate racial
imbalance on the ground that they have a constitutional right to attend a given school:
See, e.g., Guida v. Board of Educ., supra note 71, at 123, 213 A.2d at 844; Addabbo v.
Donovan, 22 App. Div. 2d 383, 388, 256 N.Y.S.2d 178, 183; Balaban v. Rubin, 20 App.
Div. 2d 438, 444, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 580. Similarly, it has been held that Negro students may
not force elimination of a de facto segregated school system solely on the basis that
they have a constitutional right to attend a given school: See, e.g., Deal v. Board of
Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 63 (6th Cir. 1965); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988, 998
(10th Cir. 1964) ; Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1963).
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speedy implementation. The Massachusetts legislature, in passing the Racial
Imbalance Act, assumed some of the responsibility of its administration. A
scheme was devised, whereby each local school committee is required to
submit an annual racial "school census" to the state commissioner of educa-
tion. If the commissioner determines that racial imbalance exists, he instructs
the local committee to prepare and file a plan to eliminate the imbalance,
with the assistance of the state board of education. 93 The matter of what
shall constitute racial imbalance is not left to the commissioner's discretion
since the Massachusetts Act defines racial imbalance as existing when the
percentage of non-white students in a school exceeds fifty per cent.9 4
The Illinois legislature, on the other hand, assumed no administrative re-
sponsibility9" in eliminating racial imbalance. By virtue of Tolnetz, a prece-
dent as to when a school should be considered racially imbalanced is estab-
lished at 85 per cent non-white students.96 Apparently, the Illinois courts
will be called upon to decide in each individual case whether a local school
board has given sufficient consideration to racial factors in redistricting or
relocating its schools. Another distinction between the two acts lies in the
strength of their sanctions. Massachusetts has teeth in its statute: a local
school committee's failure to submit a plan in compliance with the order of
the commissioner within a reasonable time results in the withholding of
state aid for the errant committee's schools.97 The Illinois legislation ap-
parently depends upon the courts to enforce the order of the Armstrong
Act.
CONCLUSION
The existence of racially imbalanced public schools, either due to prior
state-imposed separation or arising through usage, is patent throughout the
country. The cumulative effects of Brown have ironically been detrimental to
the achievement of integrated education. While Brown has opened the door
to the disestablishment of de jure segregation, it has, by restrictive interpre-
tations, provided a shield for those school systems which do not bear
the taint of past de jure segregation. This shield exists, notwithstanding
the damaging effect such a school system may have on the Negro child.
Whether racially imbalanced schools produce the same adverse effects as
93 MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 71 § 37D (1966).
94 Id.
95 Note, however, that the Illinois education structure does not include a state board
of education. A supervisory committee would necessarily have to effectuate some coor-
dination among the virtually autonomous school systems as they now exist.
96 Tometz v. Board of Educ., supra note 57, at 500.
97 MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 15, § 11 (1966).
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were attributed to segregation by law in Brown, is as yet undecided by
the court. Notwithstanding, extensive studies have indicated that the ad-
versity of de facto segregation may well exceed that of segregation by law,98
albeit the two are of different species. Urban racial unrest and civil disorder
appear to emphasize the need for reform, one thrust of which must be educa-
tional.
Barriers to understanding not only cripple the individual but also endanger the
nation. Clearly, the future of the United States depends in no small part on edu-
cation-not the education of white children but the education of all children. We
do not need another fact finding commission to tell us that something must be
done to prevent a school situation which produces apathy and hopelessness that
cause a life to be wasted, or frustration and anger that cause it to be risked in
public disorders. 99
Yet, the courts have been slow to recognize this need. Had the Illinois Su-
preme Court not reversed itself in Tometz; had the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachussetts invalidated the Racial Imbalance Act; had New York,
New Jersey, Connecticut, and Michigan forbidden implementation of remedial
procedures in the name of strict "Constitutional color-blindness," this need
would either be ignored, or its examination impaired by ingenious schemes
circumventing the caveat against considering race. Inasmuch as the courts are
not able to achieve uniformity on such a vital question, a Supreme Court ap-
proval of the validity of the benign racial classification is in order.
Nor is the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation any longer
clear. As the time span between Brown and a present desegregation case in-
creases, how can it be determined where de jure segregation has ended and
de facto segregation begun? Do the "freedom of choice" cases' 00 imply
that a court may retain jurisdiction in a desegregation case to disestablish
what might otherwise be considered de facto segregation, except for the fact
that it occurs as the aftermath of de jure segregation? Or is the overriding
factor the simple fact that children are being deprived of an equal op-
portunity to education in a state-tolerated school system? In light of past
Supreme Court decisions stretching the requirement of state action so that
a practice may fall within the purview of the fourteenth amendment, 101 the
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation seems academic.
98 See, e.g., 1 U.S. COMM'N. ON CIvm RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
73-114 (1967); BOARD OF EDUCATION, CITY OF CHICAGO, A REPORT TO THE BETTER
SCHOOLS COa2 rlTTEE at 27-30 (1968); United States v. School Dist. No. 151 of Cook
County, supra note 55.
99 United States v. School Dist. No. 151 of Cook County, supra note 55, memorandum
opinion at 5.
100 Supra note 52. See supra note 53.
1Ol Supra note 17.
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Finally, is a law such as the Armstrong Act dispositive of the problem?
Has the Illinois legislature borne its fair share of responsibility in providing
for study and alleviation of the problem? Devising schemes to effectively
remedy situations of racial isolation has been the subject of continued
study.10 2 In light of the amount of research required before a meaningful
determination can be made as to the effects and possible elimination of ra-
cially imbalanced schools, a single-paragraphed order, absent a legislative
finding of any sort as to de facto segregated schools, with no provisions for
administration or enforcement, seems a feeble effort to solve a vastly com-
plex problem. Compared with the efforts of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania,
the Armstrong Act appears to be but a token gesture.
Howard Emmerman
102 See, e.g., 1 U.S. COmm'N ON C=VIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 115-184 (1967); U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, EDUCATION PABRS (Clear-
inghouse Pub. No. 9, 1967).
EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY FOR DIRECTED VERDICTS-CAN A
JUDGE HOLD A CANDLE TO TWELVE REASONABLE MEN?
On December 7, 1960, Raymond Pedrick and his wife were injured
when their automobile collided with one of defendant's trains at a railroad
crossing in Pekin, Illinois. In an action brought by Pedrick and his wife
against the railroad, the only allegation of negligence submitted to the jury
was that defendant company negligently permitted its train to operate
through the intersection without activating the red flasher warning signals.
Testifying on behalf of plaintiffs were Raymond and Cleo Pedrick and a
passenger in their automobile, who had a separate lawsuit pending against
the defendant. Five of defendant's employees and two disinterested witnesses
testified on behalf of defendant. A jury in the Circuit Court of Tazwell
County rendered a verdict for plaintiffs and judgment was entered thereon.
Defendants appealed. The Third District Appellate Court of Illinois reversed
without remanding for a new trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed the appellate court's decision, holding that evidence on the issue of
whether crossing flasher signals were operating at the time of the accident
so overwhelmingly flavored the defendant that no contrary verdict based on
the evidence could ever stand, and therefore, defendant's motion in the trial
court for a directed verdict should have been allowed. The Court further
announced the rule that "verdicts ought to be directed and judgments n.o.v.
[sic] entered only in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed
in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors
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